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  This paper develops models of decision making in a university setting with and without faculty 
participation.  The models predict values for the level of services or programs offered and the quality of 
those services in a university setting for either private nonprofit or public universities.  These predictions 
indicate conditions under which outcomes are similar or differ with faculty participation in the decision 
process.  The model predicts that without shared governance that universities may overinvest in non-
academic quality (e.g. athletics, recreational activities).  This would be exacerbated in for-profit forms of 
higher education.   Notably, nonprofit and/or public institutions are not inefficient relative to for-profit 
institutions, which questions the rationale for subsidies to for-profit institutions.  If academic quality 
provides positive externalities as has been suggested in the literature, then shared governance may be 
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  Public and private nonprofit universities are currently experiencing serious budget problems.  The 
budgetary problems stem in part from the current state of the economy that has negatively affected state 
appropriations, endowment values, and donations.  In addition to the reductions in revenues from these 
sources, public and private nonprofit universities face increases in demand and increases in costs 
(Washburn, 2005; Zumeta, 1996).   With increasingly scarce resources and greater demand for higher 
education services, each university must make critical decisions of how to accomplish its mission while 
making the best use of limited resources.   In this study, we evaluate whether faculty involvement in 
university decision making (shared governance) affects a university's decisions over enrollment and 
investments in quality.    
  The university decision process involves either directly or indirectly multiple stakeholders and 
participants (See, for example, Morphew (1999); Davenport et al (2000); Birnbaum (2004); Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003; Hamilton, 2004; and Hermalin; 2004).  External to an individual university are boards of 
trustees, donors and/or taxpayers, and governments; internal are the administration, faculty, students and 
staff.  In this paper we focus on two parties relevant to internal decision making: the administration and 
the faculty.   As mentioned in James (1990) and Tuckman and Chang (1990), faculty and administrators 
may have conflicting goals.
1
                                                           
1   For some discussion of differences in objectives, see Tuckman and Chang, 1990; Collis, 2004; Dudestadt, 2004;  
Birnbaum, 2004; Ehrenberg et al, 2004; Kaplan, 2004a; and Lohmann, 2004 
  The faculty may wish to increase the academic quality of the university and 
may place this concern above all other concerns.  The administration may be more focused on the 
revenue generating aspects of the university and in times of fiscal constraint may choose to focus on these 
aspects rather than potentially costly investments in academic quality.  Given the different objectives of 
the faculty and the administration, it is possible that the university may make very different decisions 
according to the amount of influence the faculty has over university decisions concerning enrollment and 
investments.        Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 3 
   
 
  In this study, we propose a model of university decision making that explicitly considers the 
individual objectives of administrators and faculty by assigning weights to each of the parties objective 
functions.  The model explicitly considers decision making under three conditions: 1) sole administration 
decision making 2) shared governance with faculty participation in certain decisions and 3) equally 
shared governance.   By analyzing the effects of faculty involvement in these three situations, we are able 
to isolate how investments in academic quality and nonacademic quality vary according to the level of 
faculty participation.    
  In the past few decades, college tuition has increased faster than inflation.  This has led to 
concerns about why college costs are increasing and the types of investments that universities are 
currently making.  Recently criticism has emerged that universities are spending large amounts of money 
on dormitories, athletic centers, and other amenities that are not directly related to the academic quality of 
the university (e.g. Hacker and Dreifus, 2010).   This study demonstrates how faculty involvement in 
governance affects these types of investments in nonacademic quality.   We also investigate how the 
current economic environment may affect university investments taking note of the fact that tight 
financial constraints tend to limit faculty governance (e,g, Morphew, 1999). 
  In section 2, we provide a review of the existing literature in both economics and education on 
university decision making.  This review demonstrates the need for a behavioral theory that incorporates 
the interests of participants in the decision process.  Following the literature review, we develop our 
models in section 3 and examine the theoretical predictions of the effects of faculty governance for 
university enrollment and quality.  We develop theoretical policy implications in section 4 and policy 
implications in section 5.  Concluding remarks are given in section 6.  
2.  Literature Review and Motivation 
  The economic literature on university decision making tends to focus on the university as an 
entity that maximizes a single institutional objective, such as the reputation of the university, rather than 
focusing on the objective functions of participants in the decision making process.   While several   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 4 
   
 
economic papers recognize that participants may have conflicting goals for the university, no formal 
behavioral model of shared governance currently exists in the literature.  Within the education literature, 
most studies focus on the extent of shared governance exhibited at colleges and universities and methods 
to improve shared governance.  While quantifying the extent of shared governance at colleges and 
universities is important, the current literature does not provide guidance as to how shared governance 
could affect university outcomes.   Our paper fills the gap in both literatures by proposing a formal model 
of university decision making with and without shared governance.  We then compare the outcomes for 
the university, such as levels of undergraduate or graduate enrollment or sponsored funding, under the 
different governance structures.    
  The education literature provides information on the extent of shared governance at universities 
and provides some reasons for why shared governance varies by institutions and over time.   Three 
reasons given in the literature for why shared governance varies are: the support of the administration, the 
fiscal environment, and technological change.   Miller (2001) finds that college presidents show some 
interest in shared governance but there seems to be a preference for limiting the role of faculty to certain 
issues, such as curriculum.  The Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis (CHEPA) (2003) and 
Kaplan (2004a) both examine survey data and address questions on the functioning and effectiveness of 
shared governance, with similar results.  Both CHEPA (2003) and Kaplan (2004a) find generally good 
faculty/administration relations.  They also find, however, that to some degree faculty lacks confidence in 
the ability of the faculty senate to affect policy, particularly during times of fiscal constraint.   
  Morphew (1999) and Birnbaum (2004) focus on shared governance structures under changing 
environments.  Morphew examines the implications of technological change and environmental change, 
particularly the fiscal environment, faced by colleges and universities.  Both technological change and 
environmental change tend to limit the faculty’s role in governance.  Birnbaum’s study expands on this 
idea by distinguishing between academic and market institutions, where “academic” refers to traditional 
not-for-profit educational institutions that may be either private or public, while “market” refers to 
institutions that are for-profit corporations.  In the former, scholarship, inquiry, and learning are the focus,   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 5 
   
 
whereas in the latter, offering training and earning profits are the focus.  He states that speed and 
efficiency in decision making, of greater concern in the latter, may be reduced by faculty participation so 
that any increased emphasis on these due to external environmental pressure can serve to limit shared 
governance.  Washburn (2005) and Zumeta (1996) support the view that technology and the fiscal 
environment can affect academic institutions’ response to increasing demand and costs and imply a limit 
to shared governance, although somewhat differently than Morphew (1999) and Birnbaum (2004).   
Washburn demonstrates that the increasing role of university investment in laboratories to provide 
marketable patents through the participation of faculty research to this end, but not necessarily 
governance.  Zumeta examines alternative policies for state higher education systems in the face of 
increased demand.  He finds that a so-called market competitive policy where state policies incorporate 
the private sector and minimize regulation may be best suited to accommodate the higher demand for 
higher education.  His work supports the implications of both Morphew (1999) and Birnbaum (2004) of 
limited faculty participation by focusing on producer’s interests but his analysis differs in that its focus is 
on the role of the governing board.   
  The economics literature on universities typically assumes that universities are attempting to 
maximize the reputation of the university.  This idea is developed in Garvin (1980).   However, the 
university is made up of several different participants with possibly different goals.  Tuckman and Chang 
(1990) provide a description of the participants at the university and for each of the participants their 
possible goals.   Our study focuses on the interaction between two of the participants, faculty and 
administrators, and how that affects decision-making at a university.  As mentioned in James (1990) and 
Tuckman and Chang (1990), faculty and administrators may have conflicting goals.  Previously, Kaplan 
(2004b) focuses on the effects of shared governance on faculty workloads and pay.   In our study, we 
focus on the effects of shared governance on university decisions over whether to invest in academic 
quality or nonacademic quality and on enrollment.    
  While the literature on shared governance in universities is lacking a formal theoretical model, 
several theoretical models from organizational behavior outside of higher education as well as those that   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 6 
   
 
model some aspect of university decisions have implications for the effects of shared governance on 
outcomes.   Hammond (1986) examines the relationship between agendas and hierarchy in organizations.  
His model demonstrates that organizational structures are similar to agendas, and that those who control 
the structure/agenda will determine the policy decision outcome.   Although his paper does not 
specifically focus on decision making in higher education, his model has implications for the relevance of 
shared governance (or lack thereof) and decision outcomes in colleges and universities.  Hammond 
(2004) formally models the organization of academic units in higher education to promote scholarship but 
is not concerned with shared governance.  Wilson (2004) analyzes the effects of decision structure by 
comparing central management and decentralized (departmental) decision structures in organizations of 
higher education.   He finds that central budgeting is superior (that is, more efficient) to decentralization 
due to interdepartmental competition.  He notes, however, that this result may be based on the assumed 
form of unit compensation and the problem of externalities, such as student majors’ taking courses from 
other departments, and ignores information asymmetries.  He also notes that there may be differential 
effects on research and teaching under centralized and decentralized decision structures.    
  Our review of the literature shows an absence of a behavioral theory of shared governance.  We 
fill this gap by modeling university decision making both with and without shared governance by faculty.   
Building on the information in Tuckman and Chang (1990) and James (1990), we develop utility 
functions for administrators and faculty.   We then analyze how choices about enrollment and 
investments vary according to whether faculty can influence the decision making process.  Since the 
education literature stresses that the amount of shared governance may be limited under times of financial 
distress, we analyze the outcomes under a break-even constraint.   The break-even constraint is also 
mentioned in James (1990).   We also analyze the effects of shared governance under an academic quality 
constraint.   Our models are developed fully below.   
3. A Model of Decision Making in Institutions of Higher Education   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 7 
   
 
  The decision makers in our models are the university administrators (AD) and faculty (F); 
university enrollment (E) may consist of two possible student types, undergraduates (UG) and graduates 
(G), the latter includes those seeking either a masters degree or the Ph.D., where E = UG + G.  
Enrollment is assumed to depend on price (P) for each student type and institutional quality (Q), so that E 
= E(P, Q).   The price (P) to the student of educational services at any institution is tuition + fees + other 
costs – financial aid, where other costs may include residential and/or transportation costs, books and 
supplies, etc.  Tuition, other costs, and financial aid may be determined outside of the university itself.   
For example, the university board or state legislatures may determine or explicitly affect the level of 
tuition. Therefore, for our purposes here price (P) is considered as exogenous in the decision process.   
  Quality (Q) of an institution of higher education is composed of two components, academic (AQ), 
reflected in the level and offerings of program, curriculum, faculty, etc., and/or nonacademic (NQ), such 
as the quality of athletic teams or student activity facilities; Q =(AQ, NQ).    We assume that 
undergraduate enrollment responds to its price and both academic and nonacademic quality: UG = 
UG(PU, Q).  Graduate student enrollment responds to its price and the level of academic quality: G = 
G(PG, AQ).  Sponsored funds (S) may be obtained through a number of sources, such as donations, grants, 
and/or appropriations.  Sponsored funds are assumed to depend on institutional quality through the ability 
to obtain funding for academic research and programs, nonacademic programs, and capital (buildings). 
The ability to raise sponsored funds depends on sources from the public sector (government grants, 
appropriations) and the private sector (foundation grants, donations, such as from alumni).  Therefore the 
ability to obtain sponsored funding for the institution is affected by both academic and nonacademic 
quality of the institution: S = S(Q).    
  Optimal (efficient) values of enrollment (Eopt), quality (Qopt), and sponsored funding (Sopt) are 
defined as the level of each that maximizes net social benefits, represented by net revenues to institutional 
stakeholders/principals.   For example, the stakeholders/principals of a university may be the boards of 
trustees, acting on behalf of the contributors for private nonprofit institutions or the taxpayers for public 
institutions.  There is a literature on shared governance with respect to external boards, such as through   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 8 
   
 
board composition and representation, but this literature does not consider the internal decision process of 
the university (see, for example, Toma (1986, 1990), Zumeta (1996), Hermalin (2004), Heller (2004) and 
Hamilton (2004)).  
    We propose that the size of the institution is defined by student enrollment at all levels, and that 
university revenue is obtained through enrollment of all student types and through sponsored funds, such 
as donations, grants, and appropriations. Thus, while revenue is a direct function of student enrollment 
and sponsored funds, it is an indirect function of quality.  The revenue function for a university is 
therefore given as  
  R = R[UG(PUG,Q), G(PG, AQ), S(Q)] = R[E(P,Q), S(Q)].   (1)
   
  Cost to the institution is the cost of providing student related services, the cost of providing a 
given level of quality services, and the cost to obtain sponsored funds, such as marketing costs and  
faculty and staff time. Thus, cost is a direct function of student enrollment and generating sponsored 
funds. Quality, however, affects cost both directly and indirectly through its ability to affect enrollment 
and sponsored funds. The total cost function for a college or university is therefore given as 
  C = C[UG(PUG,Q), G(PG, AQ), S(Q), Q] =  C[E(P,Q), S(Q), Q],   (2)
   
where C = total cost and the other variables are as defined above. 
  Our model assumes homogeneous educational services per enrollment type and some given level 
of minimum required quality of educational service( ) Q , such as that required for accreditation for 
nonprofit private and public institutions, as well as available physical capacity to meet enrollment goals.  
We assume the usual diminishing marginal revenue and diminishing marginal utility (U) with constant or 
increasing cost.  Thus, for any function R(E,Q,S), U(E,Q,S), C(E,Q,S), we assume:  
'
i R  > 0, 
'
i U  > 0, 
'
i C  > 
0, where prime notation denotes first derivatives, i = E, Q, S; and 
' '
i R  < 0, 
' '
i U  < 0, and
' '
i C  > 0, where 
double prime notation denotes second derivatives and the subscript i is as defined above.  We assume an   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 9 
   
 
imperfectly competitive market for the services of higher education, so that an individual institution has 
some market power and faces a downward sloping demand for its specific educational services.   
A Model of Shared Governance in University Decision Making 
    For a university, the administrators or decision makers for the institution are taken here to be the 
president and provosts for academic and business affairs.  The assumed institutional objective for our 
model of administrative decision making in a nonprofit university is the maximization of institutional 
revenue for a given required standard of quality and available sponsored funds, subject to the breakeven 
constraint that revenue at least cover cost of providing university services [(see, for example, Kaplan 
(2004a, 2004b, Keller, 2004, Washburn, 2005)].
2
  We propose here that the measure of revenue reflects the sources of utility to the administration. 
Accordingly, the objective of the administration in higher education in our model to maximize utility is 
consistent with the institutional objective of maximizing institutional revenue, where undergraduate and 
graduate enrollment, institutional academic and nonacademic quality, and sponsored funding are now 
variable.  The administration’s utility function is therefore given as: 
   Maximum revenue is obtained through enrollment at 
all levels and through sponsored funds, such as donations, grants, and appropriations.    The 
administrators maximize their utility and are assumed to obtain utility from increased income, reputation, 
and social standing.   These sources of satisfaction to administrators depend on the size and/or prestige of 
the institution, which depend on its success in achieving its educational and research mission and its 
public profile.  Coates and Humphreys (2002) provide some evidence for this in their work.  They 
empirically demonstrated the preferences of university presidents or academic provosts by examining the 
relationship between their tenure in office and changes in academic programs.  As noted above, the 
literature on decision making in institutions of higher education indicate that to achieve their goals the 
primary focus of the administration is on revenue and the budget of the institution.   
                                                           
2 Zemsky, Wegner and Massy (2005) assert that universities seek “to maximize mission attainment,” which they 
define as the production of high quality education, research and public service (p. 59).  We propose that seeking 
maximum revenue is consistent with this and has the advantage of measurability.   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 10 
   
 
  max UAD  = max UAD{R[E(P,Q), S(Q)]} = max R[E(P,Q), S(Q)]   
     = max R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)]   (3) 
  We propose that faculty obtain utility from income and academic reputation and prestige, 
primarily through publishable research.  These are assumed to increase with having graduate programs 
that provide teaching and research assistants, academic quality that promotes this enrollment, sponsored 
funding and other sources of support for research.  The role of faculty in shared governance has been 
primarily concerned with the academic aspects of the university rather than with its financial aspects, and 
in particular, with workload (see, for example, Kaplan, 2004a and Dudestadt, 2004).  Accordingly, the 
assumed objective of faculty is to maximize utility, UF, given as 
  max UF, = UF[G(PG, AQ), AQ, S(AQ, NQ)].         (4) 
  Both the administration and faculty face an institutional breakeven constraint and constraints on 
quality; assuming that class sizes can be increased and facilities uses altered over time, no long run 
capacity constraint is imposed.  The decision constraints are therefore stated as: 
  R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)] 
  - C[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ), AQ, NQ] – k1 > 0,  
  Q Q j ≥ , or 0 2 = − − k Q Q j ,  j = AQ, NQ, and 
  kγ is a slack variable, kγ > 0, γ = 1, 2.    (5) 
  The levels of undergraduate and graduate enrollment, UG, and G, the levels of academic and 
nonacademic quality, AQ, and NQ, and sponsored funding, S, that likely would result depend on the 
relative weights of the objectives of the university administration and the faculty.
3
                                                           
3 Birnbaum (2004, p. 5) and Collis (2004, p. 37) specifically note the existence and weights of multiple objectives of 
participants in the decision process within the university.  Zemsky, Wegner and Massy (2005, p. 63) note that 
different weights may be applied by single or multiple decision makers on the attributes of a decision. 
  The relative weight   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 11 
   
 
indicates the ability of faculty to influence the allocation of resources toward those that promote faculty 
interests, such as opportunities to increase publishable research.   This suggests that the amount of shared 
governance at a university directly affects university investments. 
  Formally, the decision process can be modeled as a multiple objective optimization problem 
using a weighting method, where wAD = weight on the administrative objective and wF  = weight on the 
faculty’s objective.  As noted in the literature, the relative weights vary by institution.  For example, for 
an institution with essentially no shared governance, wF = 0; the value of wF increases as faculty have a 
greater role in the decision process.  The objective function for the multiobjective decision problem is 
given as: 
  max Z(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S,)  = max [UAD, UF]  
      = max [R(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S), UF(G, AQ, S)].    (6) 
When weighted, Z becomes a function of the variables and the weights, so that (6) becomes 
  max Z(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S, wi)  = max [wADUAD, wFUF],      i = AD, F  






w = , so that when written out in full, this is given as 
   max Z(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S, w)   
    = max {R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)] 
      + w[UF(G(PG, AQ), AQ, S(AQ ,NQ)]}   (6a) 
subject to 
  R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)] 
    - C[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ), AQ, NQ] – k1 > 0,    Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 12 
   
 
  Q Q j ≥ , or 0 2 = − − k Q Q j ,  j = AQ, NQ, and 
  kγ > 0, γ = 1, 2.       (6b) 
The corresponding Lagrangian to be maximized is  
  max ψ(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S, w)   
    = max {R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)] 
      +  w[UF(G(PG, AQ), AQ, S(QAQ ,QNQ)]}   
    - λ1(R[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ)] 
    - C[UG(PUG,AQ, NQ), G(PG,AQ), S(AQ, NQ), AQ, NQ] – k1)  
      - λ2( 2 k AQ AQ − − ) 
- λ3( 3 k NQ NQ − − ) }    (7) 
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers.  The first order conditions for the Lagrangian with respect 
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These yield behavioral predictions for different levels of shared governance, that is, different values of w.  
We derive predictions in each case for two scenarios: binding fiscal and quality constraints and when 
those constraints are not binding.  Constraints may be externally imposed for a number of reasons.  These 
include those that may originate as a result of market or macroeconomic conditions or political 
conditions, such as by state legislatures.  In some cases private contributors may also impose conditions 
that may serve to act as constraints on choices in the university.   
  Predictions developed below are summarized in Table 1.  Proofs of derivations are provided in 
the appendix. 
Administration control: No shared governance (w = 0) 
The weight takes on a value of zero when decisions are made exclusively by the administration, with no 
role in the decision process by faculty.  This is consistent with Hammond (2004), which does not focus 
on shared governance, but instead has the role of faculty as "employees" or "subordinates," that is, agents 
who carry out the policies of the administration, something completely at odds with faculty participation 
in decision making.   
I. Binding breakeven constraint (tight financial constraints)   
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  Under required 
breakeven conditions, when the utility (revenue) maximizing administration is the sole decision maker, 
administrators are unable to influence or increase these beyond the socially optimal level that maximizes 
institutional net benefits (as measured by net revenue):  UG = UGopt, G = Gopt, and S = Sopt. 
Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):     Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 14 
   
 
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that decisions made solely by 
administration result in the revenue maximizing level and consequent overinvestment in both AQ and NQ, 
that is, AQR > AQopt  >  AQ and NQR > NQopt  >  NQ.  We note also that while the revenue from 
additional quality has only an implicit component, the cost of additional quality has both an implicit and 
explicit component.  The implicit cost component reflects the forms of academic (or nonacademic) 
quality which are more visible and which serve to promote enrollment (both UG and G) and sponsored 
funding, S.  The explicit cost component reflects other forms of academic (or nonacademic) quality which 
are less visible and therefore tend not to affect either enrollment or sponsored funding levels.  When both 
the breakeven and quality constraints are binding, the level of investment in implicit AQ depends on the 
level of the marginal cost of explicit quality.  AQ is optimal when marginal explicit cost has a value of 1, 
above optimal when the marginal explicit cost of quality is less than 1, and below optimal when marginal 
explicit cost exceeds a value of 1.  Thus, for the most likely case of a value greater than 1, the model 
predicts that revenue maximization by the administration results in underinvestment in implicit AQ: 
AQUG,G,S < AQopt.  In this case, investment in academic quality specifically to increase undergraduate or 
graduate enrollment or sponsored funding is below optimal levels. 
 Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  The model predicts that under no shared 
governance a revenue maximizing administration results in optimal investment in AQ or NQ.  There is, 
however, investment in the implicit forms of both AQ and NQ is optimal only if the marginal cost of 
explicit quality is zero; otherwise implicit AQ and NQ are below optimal levels.  Thus the model predicts 
that investment in these forms of quality are likely too low under administration decision control.  
II. Nonbinding breakeven constraint (potential deficit conditions) 
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  If the university 
operates at a deficit for any period of time, then the model predicts that with administration control, 
undergraduate enrollment (UG), graduate enrollment (G), and sponsored funding (S) are at the revenue   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 15 
   
 
maximizing levels.  Therefore, each component of enrollment and the level of sponsored funding all 
exceed the socially optimal levels: UG = UGR > UGopt, G = GR > Gopt and S = SR > Sopt. The above 
optimal enrollments and sponsored funding may be a strategy to move the university toward a breakeven 
level.  Alternatively, above optimal enrollment may contribute to the university deficit situation by 
increasing costs. In this situation fiscal constraint may move the university closer to socially optimal 
undergraduate and graduate enrollment as well as sponsored funding levels by limiting upward pressure 
on costs.   
Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):   
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that decisions made solely by 
the administration yield the minimum required standards of academic quality and nonacademic quality: 
AQ AQ =  and  NQ NQ = .  The administration therefore has no ability to influence the level of AQ 
under a binding quality constraint even under deficit conditions.     
Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  When both the breakeven and quality 
constraints are not binding, administration decision control (w = 0) yields the revenue maximizing levels 
and consequent overinvestment in both AQ and NQ.  This implies that the minimum quality standard is 
below optimal ( AQ < AQopt < AQR) and the nonbinding quality constraint may be used by the 
administration to seek additional funding (implicitly through increased enrollment, both UG and G, and 
increased sponsored funding, S) in order to meet its revenue maximizing objective.   
Equally shared governance (w = 1) 
I. Binding breakeven constraint (tight financial constraints)   
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  Under required 
breakeven conditions, when the revenue maximizing administration and utility maximizing faculty 
equally participate in the decision process, neither can influence or increase these above the socially   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 16 
   
 
optimal level that maximizes institutional net benefits (as measured by net revenue) UG = UGopt, G = 
Gopt, and S = Sopt. 
Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):   
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that decisions made with equal 
participation by the administration and the faculty in shared governance yield the same results as if there 
were no faculty participation (w = 0).   Thus equally shared governance results in revenue maximizing 
levels, that is, overinvestment in both AQ and NQ, where AQ > AQopt  >  AQ and NQ > NQopt  >  NQ.  
As before, the distinction between implicit quality and explicit quality play a role in the predicted 
investment levels of academic quality (AQ). When both the breakeven and quality constraints are binding, 
the level of investment in implicit AQ depends on the level of the marginal cost of explicit quality.  The 
model predicts that when the additional cost of explicit quality exceeds a value of 1, equally shared 
governance of the administration with the faculty results in underinvestment in implicit AQ: AQUG,G,S < 
AQopt.  Investment in academic quality designed specifically to promote undergraduate or graduate 
enrollment or sponsored funding is below optimal levels. 
Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  The model predicts that under conditions of 
equally shared governance a revenue maximizing administration together with a utility maximizing 
faculty together choose optimal investment in AQ or NQ.  As with sole administration control, in this case 
as well investment in the implicit forms of both AQ and NQ is optimal only if the marginal cost of 
explicit quality is zero; otherwise implicit AQ and NQ are below optimal levels.  Thus the model predicts 
that AQ < AQopt and NQ < NQopt, i.e., the levels of investment in both academic and nonacademic quality 
are likely to too low under equally shared governance. 
II. Nonbinding breakeven constraint (potential deficit conditions) 
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  The model 
predicts that if the university need not break even, with decision control equally shared by the   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 17 
   
 
administration and faculty, undergraduate enrollment (UG) is above optimal and at the revenue 
maximizing level, while graduate enrollment (G), and sponsored funding (S) are above optimal but below 
the revenue maximizing levels.  Thus, UG = UGR > UGopt, G = GR > Gopt and S = SR > Sopt. As with sole 
administration decision control, the above optimal enrollments and sponsored funding may be a strategy 
to move the university toward a breakeven level.  Alternatively, above optimal enrollment may contribute 
to the university deficit situation. We predict two possible effects.  One is that fiscal constraint may move 
the university closer to socially optimal undergraduate and graduate enrollment as well as sponsored 
funding levels.  The other is that even without imposed fiscal constraints, participation of faculty in the 
decision process through equally shared governance can correct at least some of the overinvestment by 
the administration in graduate enrollment and sponsored funding. 
Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):  
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that decisions under equally 
shared governance of the administration and faculty result in the minimum acceptable standard levels of 
academic and nonacademic quality, that is, AQ AQ =  and  NQ NQ = .  The model predicts, therefore, 
that partial and even equal participation of faculty with the administration in the decision process has no 
influence on the level of AQ or NQ under a binding quality constraint even under deficit conditions.     
Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  Decision making related to AQ or NQ that is 
shared by faculty and the administration is more complex with no binding quality constraint.  In the case 
of equal weights in the decision process (w = 1) we find different effects for AQ and NQ.  For academic 
quality, the model predicts that the level of investment in implicit forms of AQ chosen by the 
administration to increase enrollment (UG and G) and sponsored funding (S) is smaller than either the 
level that would be chosen by faculty to increase only G and S or the level that would generate explicit 
benefits for faculty.  Therefore, our model predicts that when faculty have equal weight in the decision   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 18 
   
 
process with the administration, faculty participation increases investment for either of these purposes 
relative to the level that the administration would choose   
  For nonacademic quality, the model predicts the reverse.  With equal participation by faculty and 
the administration in decision making, the model yields the result that for implicit forms of nonacademic 
quality designed to increase both UG and S for the interests of the administration, NQ = NQR > NQopt and 
NQR > NQF.   This indicates that for purposes of expanding revenue from undergraduate enrollment 
(sponsored funding), the administration invests in a greater level of NQ than would be chosen by the 
faculty.  Because revenue maximizing administrators overinvest in NQ, the model predicts that an equal 
weight in faculty participation serves to reduce this overinvestment and move NQ closer to the optimal 
level.   
Faculty control (w = ∞)  
I. Binding breakeven constraint (tight financial constraints)   
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  Even when the 
utility maximizing faculty control the decision process, a requirement to at least break even indicates that 
faculty cannot influence or increase these above the socially optimal level that maximizes institutional net 
benefits (as measured by net revenue) UG = UGopt, G = Gopt, and S = Sopt. 
Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):   
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that when decisions on quality 
are controlled by the faculty, the level of investment in AQ depends on the value of the faculty’s marginal 
utility of AQ (or NQ).  Either form of quality is optimal if marginal utility takes on a value of 1; it is 
below optimal if marginal utility exceeds a value of 1.  However, with faculty in full control neither of 
these is likely.  Alternatively, AQ (or NQ) is above optimal for marginal utility less than 1.  Thus, at the 
faculty’s utility maximizing level of academic quality where marginal utility is 0, AQUmax > AQopt and 
NQUmax > NQopt    Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 19 
   
 
Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  The model predicts that with faculty in control 
of decisions on academic or nonacademic quality, utility maximization by faculty, when marginal utility 
is 0, results in optimal AQ and NQ.  Thus, even with a binding breakeven constraint, if there is no binding 
quality constraint faculty preferences reflect social preferences for academic quality.  We note, however, 
that in the situation of a binding breakeven constraint, regardless of whether or not the quality constraints 
are binding, faculty cannot influence the level of either academic or nonacademic quality unless they 
have full control of decision making over that component of quality. 
II. Nonbinding breakeven constraint (potential deficit conditions) 
Undergraduate enrollment (UG), Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S):  If the university 
may operate at a deficit for any period of time, then undergraduate enrollment (UG), graduate enrollment 
(G), and sponsored funding (S) are each greater than the optimal levels.  In a university setting where 
graduate students are the primary contributors to faculty research, the utility maximizing faculty will not 
influence undergraduate enrollment, and the level will be determined by administration policy (i.e., the 
revenue maximizing level).  However, when faculty has influence with control in decision making, both 
graduate enrollment (G) and sponsored funding (S) are affected.  In particular, two effects are predicted.  
When faculty control decisions related to graduate enrollment (G) or investment in academic quality for 
the purpose of increased sponsored funding (S), then the number of graduate students and the level of 
sponsored funding are greater than their corresponding revenue maximizing levels.  The faculty choose 
the levels that maximize faculty utility.  In this situation G = GF  > GR > Gopt and S = SF > SR > Sopt. 
 Academic and Nonacademic quality (AQ) and (NQ):   
Binding quality constraint (AQ >  AQ or NQ >NQ):  The model predicts that with a binding quality 
constraint faculty that have decision control choose the revenue maximizing levels of academic and 
nonacademic quality, where AQR > AQopt and NQR > NQopt.  While this may seem counterintuitive, it 
seems that with full faculty control, this result indicates that faculty preferences can be consistent with   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 20 
   
 
revenue maximization under some circumstances, such as when a quality constraint is enforced.   There 
are some differences, however, in these predictions.  This outcome under a binding quality constraint 
differs from that when the administration is solely in control, which led to the minimum acceptable 
standard of quality (AQR  =  AQ or NQR > NQ), i.e., the lower level of the imposed constraint.  Faculty, 
on the other hand, will choose levels of quality above the minimum acceptable level (AQF > AQ or NQF 
> NQ), those that at the same time would increase revenue to the university when the breakeven 
constraint is not binding.    
 Nonbinding quality constraint (AQ <  AQ or NQ <NQ):  With faculty decision control, faculty will 
choose the levels of academic and nonacademic quality that maximize their utility. In this situation, the 
predicted outcome is utility maximizing levels of quality that exceed both the optimal level and the 
revenue maximizing level.   Thus, the model predicts AQF  > AQR > AQopt and NQF  > NQR > NQopt.   
4. Behavioral Implications 
  Our model is based on a decision process that involves objectives of revenue and utility 
maximization, and yield testable predictions. Even under these objectives, the model indicates that when 
universities are required to at least cover their costs, that the decisions on undergraduate and graduate 
enrollments, academic and nonacademic quality, and sponsored funding yield socially optimal outcomes 
except under certain specific conditions that yield implications for investment of university resources.   In 
addition, in a university setting faculty involvement in the decision process can affect the levels of 
graduate enrollments (G), academic quality (AQ) and nonacademic quality (NQ), and sponsored funding 
(S), while decisions that affect undergraduate enrollments (UG) are based on revenue considerations by 
the administration. In addition, our model shows that the effects on AQ and on NQ are quite different 
when decision making involves the faculty than when it does not.   
    One implication of our model concerns the level of investment in academic quality (AQ) and 
nonacademic quality (NQ) under sole administration decision making (w = 0) or equally shared   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 21 
   
 
governance (w = 1) when both breakeven and quality constraints are binding.  In these cases, there is 
overinvestment in AQ and NQ.  Optimal investment in academic and nonacademic quality designed to 
enhance enrollment and sponsored funding (i.e., implicit AQ and NQ) results under only one specific 
condition.   This condition requires that the marginal cost of increasing quality for purposes other than 
increasing enrollment and sponsored funding (i.e., explicit marginal cost of quality 
'
exp C , has a value of 
1).   
  Explicit cost most likely reflects forms of academic or nonacademic quality that are less visible 
forms than those promoted to increase enrollment or sponsored funding.  Examples of these explicit costs 
of quality are investments in roofing, increased energy efficiency measures, certain aspects of faculty 
quality, etc., that is, intangibles that may improve the campus life and environment as well as the 
educational experience.  Investments of these forms of quality may go unnoticed by either potential 
students or donors, and therefore not increase either enrollment or sponsored funding.  We find that when 
budgets must be balanced or there are tight financial concerns with a deficit, if the cost of quality has both 
implicit and explicit components, then only if the additional cost of the latter equals a value of 1 will 
investment in the implicit forms of AQ and NQ to generate enrollment and funding be optimal.  
Otherwise, when the administration controls decisions, there is too little investment in these forms of 
quality.   
  A second implication of our model of shared governance concerns the level of investment in 
academic quality (AQ) and nonacademic quality (NQ) also when both breakeven and quality constraints 
are binding.  The model shows that the overinvestment in AQ or NQ results more from decisions made by 
the administration (w = 0) than from those made by faculty ( ∞ = w ).   
  We note that this result can occur when the breakeven constraint is not in effect; however, the 
level of overinvestment by both parties in this case depends on the relative roles of administration 
( 0 → w ) and faculty ( ∞ → w ) in the decision process and the strength of the quality constraint.  For 
example, our findings show that in the case when neither the breakeven nor the quality constraint is   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 22 
   
 
binding, investment in AQ is higher when the decision process is driven by faculty (w > 1); alternatively, 
NQ investment is higher when the administration exerts greater control in the decision process (w = 0).   
  These results suggest that with shared governance of a utility (revenue) maximizing 
administration and utility maximizing faculty, both AQ and NQ take on additional importance in the 
decision making process.  However, this would occur for nonacademic quality (NQ) to different degrees 
by the administration and by faculty, whose interest in NQ is primarily to increase the potential for 
sponsored funding for their research, so it is much smaller.  In particular, an implication of our findings is 
that for NQ, aspects of universities such as facilities available for student extracurricular activities, or 
athletic resources and facilities, or investment in physical plant and grounds will be increased relative to 
those resources that would be used for academic quality (AQ).  The result of above optimal investment in 
NQ suggests that administrators who seek maximum revenue focus more on the nonacademic component 
of quality.  We find that with neither breakeven nor binding constraints faculty participation (either 
equally or in full) in the decision process reduces overinvestment in NQ and by doing so increases 
efficiency in resource allocation within the university. 
  A third behavioral implication of administration decision control (w = 0) is that under investment 
in AQ and NQ results under deficit conditions with a binding quality constraint.  Moving from breakeven 
even to deficit therefore reverses the investment behavior of the administration with respect to both types 
of quality.  In this case the deficit condition may drive AQ or NQ from the efficient level to the minimum 
acceptable standard.  This result may reflect a cost saving strategy by the administration.  Alternatively, if 
faculty control quality decisions, investment in either AQ or NQ is above the minimum standard and is 
the level that maximizes university revenue.  This indicates that faculty in deficit situations, in seeking to 
satisfy their own preferences, can choose an outcome that is consistent with preferences of a revenue 
maximizing administration. 
  In a possible deficit situation but with no quality constraint, a fourth implication of our model is 
that under either sole administration control (w = 0) or equally shared control with faculty (w = 1), that   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 23 
   
 
neither faculty nor the administration have an ability to affect investment in AQ or NQ above the 
minimum acceptable standard, so that AQ AQ =  and NQ NQ = .  The one exception occurs in implicit 
AQ and NQ, the forms that are designed specifically to increase enrollment and sponsored funding.  In 
this case the administration, with or without equally shared governance, underinvests in implicit AQ 
relative to the socially optimal level.  However, faculty control ( ∞ = w ) of the decisions on AQ serves to 
correct that and move investment in AQ toward the socially optimal level. 
  A fifth implication of our findings is that, in general, when the university is not breaking even, 
investment is greater than optimal in enrollment (UG and G), quality (AQ and NQ), and sponsored 
funding (S), although the effects vary with and without faculty participation. With no faculty participation 
(w = 0), when the breakeven requirement does not hold the administration’s investment in UG and G, AQ 
and NQ, and S are each greater than optimal.  Faculty participation in the decision process may increase 
graduate enrollment (G) and academic quality (AQ).   However, the extent of these effects depends on the 
degree of faculty participation, and, for AQ in particular, the degree of the quality constraint and 
motivation. For example, overinvestment in AQ could result from an emphasis by the administration on 
academic quality that is primarily limited to undergraduates which may have the unintended consequence 
of adversely affecting research levels.  Alternatively, faculty, having a personal as well as institutional 
interest in research, may focus more on the benefits of academic quality of the institution in and of itself 
as a way to promote this.   And as noted earlier, faculty participation in university decision making may 
serve to reduce the inefficient effects of overinvestment in nonacademic quality (NQ) by the 
administration.   
  These findings suggest that in periods of not breaking even, overinvestment in sponsored funding 
(S) may be a response by the administration, and possibly by faculty due to pressure from the 
administration, to solve the deficit problem.  The causal relationship between deficit situations and both 
enrollment and quality is less clear.  It is possible that overinvestment in enrollment, particularly graduate 
enrollment, and quality may be a response like that in the case of sponsored funding, that is, a way to   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 24 
   
 
increase revenues to help close the deficit.  This could be the case if university revenues are in some way 
tied to enrollment levels, for example, or if the increased quality is a means to increase sponsored funding 
as a revenue source.  Our findings could explain situations where university administrators put increasing 
pressure on faculty to seek external funding and to develop graduate programs and increase graduate 
enrollment with its associated higher revenues.  Alternatively, it is possible that the overinvestment in 
both enrollment and quality may be a source of the deficit situation rather than a strategy to reduce it.  In 
this case, faculty participation that may reduce overinvestment in nonacademic quality may help to 
reduce any potential deficit. 
  Thus, faculty participation in decision making has some influence that may increase graduate 
enrollment and sponsored funding.  This suggests that both graduate enrollment and sponsored funding 
may provide revenue sources that may offset revenue shortfalls, through higher graduate tuition and the 
increased sponsored funding that may also underwrite some increased graduate enrollment.  Participation 
of faculty through shared governance therefore suggests that even in periods of fiscal restraint, quality 
may be increased.  This may be true in part due to faculty effects on graduate enrollment and sponsored 
funding which may be sources of providing or funding higher quality, unless there is an exogenously 
imposed quality constraint. 
5. Policy Implications 
  Our model yields implications for both internal university policy and public policy that relate the 
participation of faculty in university decisions to the efficiency of investments choices and specific 
conditions that may affect these choices.  First, while we examine only the private nonprofit or public 
universities where the goal is to maximize revenue and/or utility rather than profit, we find that under the 
breakeven condition, the model predicts optimal results in most cases.  This questions the notion that 
these organizational forms are inherently inefficient, particularly in times of fiscal restraint.  There are 
two points to consider in this respect.  One is that the divergence of these forms from the for-profit form 
may be a source of efficiency.  Recall Birnbaum’s (2004) findings that nonprofit and public forms of   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 25 
   
 
higher education focus on scholarship, while for-profit forms focus on training.  Our findings that in 
certain circumstances revenue-maximizing decisions underinvest in forms of academic quality and 
overinvest in forms of nonacademic quality are consistent with his findings.  In particular, for-profit 
institutions of higher education typically employ faculty who have primary positions elsewhere and most 
certainly put a low, if any, weight on faculty participation in internal decisions on resource allocation, 
which suggests that their investments in academic quality may be below optimal.   
  The second point on organizational form is that the relative efficiency of nonprofit and public 
versus for-profit forms of organization can take the opposite tack and focus on the possible convergence 
of these forms.  The issue of convergence has become increasingly important in higher education and 
other services.  Much of the literature suggests that convergencemay be due to increasing competition 
from for-profit institutions or from change in the technology of providing university services (Levy 
(1987); Powell and Friedkin (1987); Munitz, 2000; Rosenau, P. V. (2003); Pusser and Turner, 2004; and 
Kaplan, 2004a).  An exception to this reasoning is Carroll and Ruseski (forthcoming) who demonstrate 
that in hospitals, when the internal decision process is considered, an alternative rationale for observed 
convergence may be for-profits becoming more like nonprofits.   
  Our findings of efficiency in both nonprofit and public institutions of higher education call into 
question the efficiency rationale policies that promote homogeneity across organizational form.  This may 
apply to both internal university policies as well as public policy.  Internal policies of nonprofit and 
public university administrations that attempt to promote a business or corporate model that views 
students and parents as customers and focuses on increased mass-production of university educational 
services may be ignoring or devaluing the social benefits of divergence in institutional form (see 
Washburn (2005) and Zemsky, Wegner and Massy (2005) for example).   For public policy, it would be 
useful to examine the extent to which state and federal subsidies to for-profit institutions of higher 
education promote social preferences and efficiency across different models of higher education in the 
public and nonprofit sectors, for example, the traditional versus corporate models.     Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 26 
   
 
  Second, our findings that in some circumstances the revenue enhancing aspects of quality, and in 
particular, nonacademic quality, in institutions of higher education may be optimal, while other less 
visible forms or purposes of  quality may be subject to underinvestment, suggests one of two things.  
Either these other forms or purposes are more socially desirable to those who value university services 
(i.e., students and sponsors), or they are less socially desirable but fulfill the objectives of the decision 
makers and are emphasized in the decision process.  If the former case is correct, investment in 
nonacademic quality could be promoted and incentives could be put in place to do so.  If the latter case is 
correct, however, this would reflect a situation where resources are diverted from meeting society’s 
preferences to meeting those of the administrators to enhance revenue.  This would be consistent with 
Lindsay’s (1976) theory that focusing on so-called visible attributes of providing a service is a strategy 
for increasing revenue and budgets.  In this case investment in nonacademic forms of quality should not 
be promoted, or at least promoted less heavily.  Tax or subsidy policies could be targeted to limit these 
applications.   
  Third, our findings on the effects of shared governance with respect to quality are twofold.  We 
find that in periods of tight financial constraints with an additionally imposed quality constraint 
administration decision making results in overinvestment in total academic quality but underinvestment 
in those forms of AQ that increase enrollment and sponsored funding.  Faculty participation works in two 
ways in this case.  It may increase or maintain the overinvestment in total academic quality; and it may 
correct the underinvestment by the administration in forms of AQ that increase graduate enrollment and 
sponsored funding.  Faculty preferences may therefore contribute to this result, although for different 
reasons than increasing revenues. Alternatively, when some periods of deficit operation are permitted and 
there is a binding quality constraint faculty decision control can lead to a higher level of overinvestment 
in academic quality that maximizes both faculty utility and university revenue.  This indicates that 
consistency between faculty and administration goals is possible.  Policies could be developed to 
encourage shared governance in these situations. If, however, when faculty decisions result in 
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administration drives overinvestment in academic quality and overvalues social preferences for academic 
quality, then alternative policies to alter incentives would be warranted.     
  Our findings suggest that faculty participation can have mixed effects on quality.  Shared 
decision control works differently for academic quality and nonacademic quality.  For AQ, the 
administration tends to underinvest in implicit forms designed to promote enrollment and sponsored 
funding; faculty participation corrects this underinvestment.  For NQ, the administration tends to 
overinvest; faculty participation corrects this overinvestment.  Thus, shared governance results in the 
reallocation of resources away from NQ and toward AQ.  If there are positive externalities associated with 
academic quality so that AQ is considered to be more socially valuable than NQ, then policies to promote 
faculty participation in university decision making would be socially optimal, even though they also 
promote private utility maximizing goals for faculty.   For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
demonstrate that differences in academic quality (as measured by test scores of students) across countries 
can help to explain differences in economic growth rates.   Therefore, the potential positive effects of 
investments in academic quality on the economic growth rate of the United States may provide a rationale 
for increases in the amount of shared governance at universities.   
  We also note that the effects of faculty participation on the outcomes for graduate enrollment (G), 
sponsored funding (S), and both AQ and NQ depend on the degree of faculty participation involved.  We 
find in a number of cases that even equally shared governance (w = 1) will yield outcomes that are the 
same as those under sole administration decision control (w = 0).  In areas where faculty participation 
promote social preferences and efficiency, it may be especially important to have university policies and 
public policies that encourage greater faculty participation and control in the decision process.   
  On this point we note that Johnston (2003) and Gaff (2007) provide examples of two studies that 
seek to promote shared governance at universities and highlight some of the methods to increase shared 
governance.  Johnston (2003) examines the issues faced by faculty in participating in governance 
activities.  She provides suggestions to promote better faculty participation, such as providing an 
overview of governance structures in the institution and a governance mentor to new faculty.  Like   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 28 
   
 
Johnston, Gaff (2007) provides recommendations designed to strengthen faculty participation in shared 
governance.  Some recommendations are structural, such as linking departments with issues that are 
institutional so that faculty take a broader view of university issues, or simplifying committee structures.  
Other recommendations are behavioral, such as providing academic leadership for interdepartmental and 
institutional programs and developing better working relationships with administrators.  He also suggests 
defining and rewarding faculty activities, which is both a structural and behavioral reform.    
  Finally, the results of our model indicate that governance goes beyond issues of workload and 
salaries, as much of current literature suggests (see CHEPA (2003) and Kaplan (2004a), for example).  
Our behavioral model shows that faculty may affect levels of graduate enrollment, academic and 
nonacademic quality, and sponsored funds.  These additional effects have not been previously 
demonstrated but are important as they can have an impact on the costs of higher education as well as the 
ability to meet increasing demand.  Nonacademic quality effects, such as for athletic facilities and 
housing, may contribute to the increased costs of higher education by increasing student fees for housing, 
recreation facilities, and other forms.  Our model shows that faculty participation in governance, by 
diminishing the potential of administrators to increase some forms of nonacademic quality, may in this 
way either shift the emphasis to academic quality or contribute to reducing costs.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
  Decisions on allocating resources in institutions of higher education will have both short term and 
long term effects.  The number of programs, the faculty and staff, and the quality of the faculty and staff 
that provide them affect the ability of the university to serve its students effectively in both time frames.  
Additionally in the longer term, the ability to recruit more students and faculty will be affected as well.  
In particular, in periods of fiscal constraint when the administration and faculty are both constrained in 
the decision process, the participation of faculty in governance may affect enrollment, especially graduate 
enrollment, sponsored funding and levels of academic and nonacademic quality.  In some instances 
faculty and the administration may have consistent and shared goals, and shared governance can increase 
the efficiency of university resource allocation, particularly in the area of quality.  The model we develop   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 29 
   
 
here provides a general framework for examining the behavioral process of making these decisions, and 
testable implications for potential policy applications.    Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 30 




  Table 1. Levels of Enrollment, Sponsored Funding, and Quality under Alternative Governance Systems
  ______________________________________________________________________________ 
Governance Decision Control:  Administration  Equally shared    Faculty 
       w = 0    w = 1      ∞ = w  
   
Constraints  Variables                 ______ 
Binding breakeven   
Binding quality  UG  UGopt    UGopt         ----   
       G      Gopt        Gopt          Gopt  
       S      Sopt        Sopt           Sopt   
  AQ    AQR > AQopt
1   AQR > AQopt
1     AQR > AQopt
1  
  NQ    NQR > NQopt
2   NQR > NQopt
2     NQR > NQF > NQopt
2 
     
Binding breakeven 
  Nonbinding quality  UG   UGopt      UGopt         ----   
       G      Gopt        Gopt          Gopt  
       S      Sopt        Sopt           Sopt   
  AQ      AQ opt
1      AQ opt
1        AQopt   
  NQ      NQ opt
2      NQ opt
2       NQopt   




  Binding quality  UG     UG > UGopt  UG > UGopt      ---- 
   G   GR > Gopt  GR = GF > Gopt  GF > GR > Gopt    
   S   SR > Sopt   SR = SF > Sopt   SF > SR > Sopt    
  AQ    AQ AQ =   AQ AQ =   AQR > AQopt  
  NQ    NQ NQ =   NQ NQ =   NQR > NQopt 
   
 
Nonbinding breakeven 
  Nonbinding quality  UG    UG > UGopt  UG > UGopt      ----   
   G   GR > Gopt  GR = GF > Gopt  GF > GR > Gopt    
   S   SR > Sopt   SR = SF > Sopt   SF > SR > Sopt    
  AQ    AQR > AQopt  AQF > AQR > AQopt
3   AQF > AQR > AQopt 
  NQ    NQR > NQopt  NQR > NQopt > NQF
4   NQF > NQR > NQopt 
____________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
1In the most likely cost scenario, implicit AQ is below optimal implicit AQ, that is, AQimp < AQE, where implicit AQ 
is academic quality designed specifically to promote enrollment and sponsored funding. 
2In the most likely cost scenario, implicit NQ is below optimal implicit NQ, that is, NQimp < NQE, where implicit NQ 
is academic quality designed specifically to promote enrollment and sponsored funding. 
3With equally shared governance (w = 1) implicit AQ chosen by the administration is below the level of implicit AQ 
chosen by faculty.  This outcome is corrected with greater faculty control in the decision process. 
4With equally shared governance (w = 1) implicit NQ chosen by the administration is above both the optimal level 
and the level of implicit NQ chosen by faculty.  Greater faculty control in the decision process corrects this.   Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 31 
   
 
Appendix:  Proofs of Predictions 
Proof of predictions for undergraduate enrollment (UG) under binding and nonbinding breakeven 
conditions:    
Let UGB be defined as the breakeven level where R = C of undergraduate enrollment; UGopt the optimal 
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λ , so that UG = UGπ < UGR  for any 
revenue function R(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S), and cost function C(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S).   















, so that UG = UGR > 
UGopt  for any revenue and cost functions.   
Proof of predictions for Graduate enrollment (G) and Sponsored funding (S) under breakeven and 
deficit conditions:    
Let GB and SB be defined as the breakeven levels where R = C of graduate enrollment and sponsored 
funding, respectively; Gopt  and Sopt  the socially optimal levels of each, GR and SR the revenue 





























































   For a binding 


















, which imply that
' '
G G C R = , and 
' '
S S C R = , so that G = Gopt < GR  and S = Sopt < SR  for any R(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S), C(UG, G, AQ, NQ, S), 
and UF(G, AQ, S).     Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 32 
   
 
  For a nonbinding breakeven constraint λ1 = 0, 
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.   As  , ∞ → w   
G F G U R '  
' > so that G = GF  > 
GR > Gopt and S = SF > SR > Sopt .  Alternatively, G = GR > Gopt and S = SR > Sopt for any revenue and cost 
functions only if w = 0.   
Proof of predictions for Academic quality (AQ) and Nonacademic quality (NQ) under binding and 
nonbinding breakeven conditions: 
Binding breakeven constraint and binding quality constraints:  Let QjB  be defined as the breakeven level 
of investment in academic quality where RQj = CQj and j = AQ, NQ; Qjopt the optimal level; QjR the revenue 
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, which together imply  1 ' ' − = Qj Qj C R .   
This yields Qj > Qjopt  >  j Q .  Consider the distinction between implicit Qj (=QjUG,G,S) and explicit Qj 
(Qjexp).  Revenue is an implicit function of academic quality,
'
Qjimp R , but cost has both an implicit cost, 
' ' ' '
Qj S F UG S C UG C
Qj +  and explicit cost,
'
Qj C .  Therefore QjUG,G,S = Qjopt only if
'
exp Qj C  = 1. If 
'
exp Qj C  > 1, 
' '
Qjimp Qjimp C R < so that QjUG,G,S < Qjopt.  Alternatively, if 
'
exp C  < 1, QjUG,G,S > Qjopt.  These results hold for 







 as  ∞ → 1 λ . 







, so that 1
' ' ' − + = Qj Qj Qj C U R .  QjUmax = Qjopt only if 
'
Qj U = 1.  For 
'
Qj U > 1, QjUmax < Qjopt and for 
'
Qj U < 1, QjUmax > Qjopt.  Where 
'
Qj U = 0, QjUmax > Qjopt.     Shared Governance in University Decisions – page 33 
   
 
Binding breakeven and Nonbinding quality constraints:   From (7c) or (7d), as  ∞ → 1 λ  and 0 2 → λ , for 










).  For  0 → w ,
' '
Qj Qj C R = , 
so that Qj = Qjopt.  In addition, given
'
Qjimp R  = 
' ' ' '
Qj S F UG S C UG C
Qj +  +
'
Qj C , QjUG,G,S = Qjopt only if 
'
exp j C  = 0; 
QjUG,G,S > Qjopt for  
'









Qj Qj Qj C U R + = .   
' '
Qj Qj C R = only if 
'
Qj U = 
0 which yields Qj = Qjopt; Qj > Qjopt for 
'
Qj U > 0. 









































 depends on the relative values 









)  .  For λ2 > 0  (or λ3 > 0) and as  ∞ → 2 λ  (or  ∞ → 3 λ ), for 0 → w  and for any 















 which yields Qj = QjR > Qjopt.  For any 






















again  yielding  j j Q Q → .   





Qj -  
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.  Consider the case 
0
' > AQ R and  0
' > AQ U .  For w = 1, 
' '




AQ AQ U R >  ⇒ 
S G S G UG F R AQ AQ
, , , < . 








 or, alternatively,  1
' '




NQ S NQ UG
S U
S R UG R
.  From this we see 
that 
' ' ' '
NQ S NQ UG S U UG R <  and
' ' ' '




S S UG F R NQ NQ >
, .  
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